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 ABSTRACT 
 
Web application security is a definite threat to the world’s information technology 
infrastructure. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), generally defines web 
application security violations as unauthorized or unintentional exposure, disclosure, or loss of 
personal information. These breaches occur without the company’s knowledge and it often 
takes a while before the web application attack is revealed to the public, specifically because 
the security violations are fixed. Due to the need to protect their reputation, organizations have 
begun researching solutions to these problems. The most widely accepted solution is the use 
of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Such systems currently rely on either signatures of the 
attack used for the data breach or changes in the behavior patterns of the system to identify an 
intruder. These systems, either signature-based or anomaly-based, are readily understood by 
attackers. Issues arise when attacks are not noticed by an existing IDS because the attack does 
not fit the pre-defined attack signatures the IDS is implemented to discover. Despite current 
IDSs capabilities, little research has identified a method to detect all potential attacks on a 
system.  
 
This thesis intends to address this problem. A particular emphasis will be placed on detecting 
advanced attacks, such as those that take place at the application layer. These types of attacks 
are able to bypass existing IDSs, increase the potential for a web application security breach 
to occur and not be detected. In particular, the attacks under study are all web application layer 
attacks. Those included in this thesis are SQL injection, cross-site scripting, directory traversal 
and remote file inclusion. This work identifies common and existing data breach detection 
methods as well as the necessary improvements for IDS models. Ultimately, the proposed 
approach combines an anomaly detection technique measured by cross entropy and a 
signature-based attack detection framework utilizing genetic algorithm. The proposed hybrid 
model for data breach detection benefits organizations by increasing security measures and 
allowing attacks to be identified in less time and more efficiently.  
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Chapter 1: Motivation, Problem Statement and Contribution 
 
1.1 Background 
Even the novice user comprehends that data security breaches are not unfamiliar occurrences in 
this fast-paced, ever-advancing technological world. To understand what a data security breach is, 
the definition must be unambiguous. A data breach, specifically in relation to privacy, occurs when 
an unauthorized person, such as a skilled hacker [1], obtains the personal information of others. In 
a more general sense, a data security breach can be defined as an organization’s unauthorized or 
unintentional exposure, disclosure, or loss of personal information [2]. Another way to present this 
is to say that a data breach can be simply defined as the accidental or unintentional loss of sensitive 
data [3]. Given that such threats exist and are of high concern, it is more than important to have 
some type of intrusion detection system. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS), is a system that 
protects computer networks against attacks. These systems work with the network’s existing 
firewalls and anti-virus systems [4].  
 
Currently, there are two common types of IDS: signature-based intrusion detection systems and 
anomaly-based intrusion detection systems. Signature-based IDS are commonly called misuse-
based intrusion detection systems. These systems rely on signatures to recognize the attacks. 
Signature-based IDS would ideally identify 100% of the attacks with no false alarms as long as 
signatures are specified ahead of time. However, each signature, even if it leads to the same attack, 
has the potential to be unique from any other signatures. This is the most commonly implemented 
IDS [5, 6, 7]. 
 
The above explanation can be contrasted with the other common type of IDS: an anomaly detection 
system. This type of IDS focuses on the system’s normal behaviors instead of focusing on attack 
behaviors, as seen with signature-based intrusion detection systems. To implement this type of 
IDS, the approach is to use two phases. The first phase is the training phase where the system’s 
behavior is observed in the absence of any type of attack. Normal behavior for the system is 
identified into a profile. After this, the second phase or detection phase, begins. In this phase, the 
stored profile is compared to the way the system is currently behaving and deviations from the 
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profiles are considered potential attacks on the system. This can lead to several false negative 
alarms [8, 9, 10]. In an anomaly-based IDS, the system watches for changes from the expected 
behavior of the system. Currently, entropy and/or KLD have shown promising results in the 
literature surrounding mobile malware application detection [11]. 
 
1.2 Motivation 
Each type of system has its own benefits and drawbacks. A hybrid model can optimize the benefits 
and minimize the drawbacks of the two systems. Hybrid models are essentially the combination 
of a signature-based detection approach and an anomaly-based detection system. To explain the 
need for a hybrid model, the various attacks that can be used to create a data security breach must 
be considered. Common attacks that are utilized to carry out data breaches are SQL Injection 
(SQLI) [12], brute-force [13], buffer overflows [14], Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [15], Remote File 
Inclusion (RFI) [70], Directory Traversal (DT) [71] and Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [16] 
to name a few. In addition, hybrid models have a central focus on the newest threat: polymorphic 
attacks [17]. A limited amount of work has been done on hybrid models due to the nature of 
aforementioned polymorphic attacks [18].  
 
This research work identifies numerous types of attacks that can result in data breaches detected 
by the proposed hybrid model. The model is based on analyses of logs that are generated by the 
web server and database server, which is explained a bit later in this proposal. The results of this 
study benefit and influence decisions of network and system administrators at companies who use 
an existing IDS and those who may be looking for a more advanced IDS model. End users may 
not see an exact benefit, but the security of their personal data may be exponentially increased. 
 
In this work, we have replicated four specific web application attacks by using open source web 
applications. For the study, we employed an Apache web server and a MySQL database server in 
a virtual environment with a Windows operating system. Simultaneously, the study was run with 
an identical set up and design, but through the use of a Linux operating system. Examples of what 
the URLs may look like for the specified attacks under study are presented in the Table below. 
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Table 1: Examples of Attacks in URLs 
Attack Example URL 
SQLI http://www.xyz.com/login.php?uid=jonh&pwd=’ or 1=1 -- 
XSS http://www.xyz.com/index.php?uid=><body onload=alert('test1')>&pwd=test 
RFI http://www.xyz.com/test.php?uid=www.badsite.com/a.php 
DT http://www.xyz.com/index.php?uid=../../../../ dir/pwd.txt 
 
1.3 Problem Statement  
Log data analysis is a common practice used for the detection of data security breaches. This 
practice, however, can pose challenges for companies and organizations due to the vast number of 
data security breaches that are not detected. Several issues concerning log data analyses currently 
exist. One main problem is the creation of logs from multiple sources. The logs from all of the 
different sources do not necessarily contain the same information, creating the need for a universal 
log collector and analyzer. For instance, when a user has access to a company website, the 
company’s web application server and database server both create separate logs. If a universal log 
analyzer were in place, any potential data security breaches would be easier to identify. Another 
problem with logs on different servers is that they may be located in different geographical regions 
or time zones. The timestamp that servers automatically place on the log may not match thus 
making the detection of a data security breach that much more strenuous.  
 
Current literature shows little effort on combining anomaly-based and signature-based methods of 
identifying data security breaches and new types of attacks at the application layer. The reason for 
combining both methods is to detect even more attacks than either approach could detect alone. 
By compiling each of the approaches, additional false positive and false negative attacks can be 
discovered as well. In this thesis, the priority is to understand if current anomaly-based and 
signature-based approaches are sufficient to detect application layer attacks and how to improve 
upon these techniques. 
 
We are applying genetic algorithm to pre-existing signatures to generate mutant signatures to 
detect attack violations. Similarly, since information theoretic metrics have not appeared much in 
the literature, this thesis is aimed at incorporating information theory as a computational approach 
to develop a new anomaly-based approach. There are two key research questions we plan to answer 
in this thesis:  
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 Could we develop an anomaly-based IDS to mitigate attacks on web applications? How 
effective the new approach would be compared to other existing anomaly-based approaches? 
 How do we overcome the limited list of attack signatures in existing signature-based IDS 
with the goal of detecting new attacks? How effective is the new approach compared to 
existing signature-based approaches?  
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The research methodology involved multiple literature reviews of more than 40 articles. Content 
within the articles varied. For example, articles were included that discuss anomalies, signatures, 
intrusion detection systems, and web application attacks. The methods used for this research 
include the following activities: 
1) Conduct literature searches on attacks related to data breaches, anomaly-based attack 
detection, signature-based attack detection, hybrid models and log analysis. 
2) Explore the logs based on attack detection types, categorizing them as signature-based or 
anomaly-based detection approaches, to create an offline analysis framework for storing 
and indexing the data from the various logs. 
3) Develop a set of pre-defined signatures from an established database and a model that 
represents a normal data (training data) access pattern to make an abnormal data (testing 
data) access pattern identifiable.  
4) Calculate the result of the test log data to measure the performance of the proposed 
solution at detecting false positives and false negatives. 
5) Compare the results using information theoretic metrics with other available prototype 
tools on performance. 
 
1.5 Overview of Research Tasks 
This work addresses the stated research by performing the following tasks:  
1) Conduct Literature Search  
i. Conduct literature search on existing log combination techniques, specifically aimed at 
methods used by intrusion detection systems. Since there are two main types of intrusion 
detection systems, the literature search will include explanations and techniques of each 
type.  
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ii. Compose a survey of compiled papers related to this topic and document the findings. 
2) Develop Virtual Environment 
i. Profile available pre-defined signature and anomaly-based intrusion detection systems 
and identify common attacks within each IDS and which logs are generated by these 
attacks.  
ii. Use the resulting profile to develop a centralized log server that is connected to a web 
server and a database server collecting logs from the generated attacks.  
3) Develop Hybrid Detection Model 
i. Propose detection techniques for both types of attacks in one model. This purpose of this 
is to detect any type of attack so prevention methods can be deployed.  
ii. Use the hybrid model to demonstrate the proposed approach within controlled 
environment.  
4) Conduct Testing and Evaluation  
i. Deploy web applications in XAMPP in the Linux and Windows environments. XAMPP 
is an integrated web platform consisting of a web server and a database server.  
ii. Generate normal traffic and attack traffic data and MySQL logs and Apache logs to detect 
the application layer attacks. 
iii. Detect anomalies using information theoretic metrics with an expected false alarm rate 
below the average of 8.4% seen in the literature [8, 18].  
iv. Detect attacks that have unique signatures based on a signature database as seen in other 
studies conducted in the past [19-20]. The expected accuracy level of signature detection 
is 100%. 
5) Disseminate Work Results 
i. Disseminate the log analyzer and dataset with those in the field of technology.  
ii. Prepare and submit one or more papers for publication at relevant venues. 
 
In the next Chapter, we discuss the findings from literature surveys surrounding our research goals 
and objectives. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Overview 
This Chapter elaborates on the surrounding literature searches and explains the findings from the 
literature research. Due to the level of detail that is required for this thesis, multiple literature 
reviews were carried out, but only five directly apply to the case studies and fit within the context 
of this work. In subsequent sections, first, anomaly-based intrusion detection is explained, 
followed by a short description of how entropy is used to detect attacks. Then, a section discussing 
related literature on signature based intrusion detection is provided. Next, genetic algorithms are 
illustrated as a new avenue for attack detection. Finally, this Chapter concludes with a discourse 
about benchmarks used for evaluation of datasets in the literature.   
 
2.2 Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection 
Literature surrounding this topic is not scarce. In fact, in [21] the authors study the development 
of an IDS by a training dataset collected from a large scale web application. The work only 
considered GET requests and did not consider POST types of requests or response pages. They 
captured logs from a TShark tool and converted them to Common Log Format. The filtered data 
was generated by accessing sub-applications. They manually inspected every single request to 
gather a filtered (good) dataset. Their detection used nine models. Cho et al. [22] develop a 
Bayesian parameter estimation-based anomaly detection approach from web server logs and 
showed that it outperformed signature-based tools such as Snort. They assume a user visits a set 
of pages in a certain order (denoted as a session). Their approach is effective when the order is 
maintained. Ariu [23] develop a host-based IDS to protect web applications against attacks by 
employing the Hidden Markov Model (HMM). HMM is used to model a sequence of attributes 
and their values received by web applications. To account for various parameters and their values, 
they employ multiple HMMs and combine them to generate an output for a given request on 
likelihood that it would be generated from the training dataset.  
 
Park et al. [24] analyze both GET and POST request data and capture the profiles of the data for 
each parameter. Then they apply the Needleman-Wunch algorithm for a new parameter value to 
see if the new value would be accepted or not as part of the alarm generation process. Le et al. [25] 
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develop the DoubleGuard framework that examines both web server and database server logs to 
precisely detect attacks leaking confidential information. They report 0% false positive rate for 
static web pages, and 0.6% false positive rate for dynamic web pages. A similar approach has been 
proposed by Vigna et al. [26] earlier. Their work reduces false positive warnings in a web-based 
anomaly IDS by combining web log anomaly detection and a SQL query anomaly detector. In 
their approach, a request that was found to be anomalous, based on logs, would still be issued to a 
database server if it is found that the request is not accessing sensitive data from the server.  
 
Ludinard et al. [27] profile web applications by learning invariants (e.g., a user session should 
have same value as the login value). Then source code is instrumented to check violation of 
invariants. If an invariant is violated, it indicates an anomalous input has been supplied. Li et al. 
[28] develop an anomaly-based IDS by first decomposing web sessions into workflows. A 
workflow consists of a set of atomic requests which may access one or more data objects. They 
apply HMM to model the sequence of the data access of workflows. Gimenez et al. [29] develop 
a web application firewall (as an anomalous request detector) and captured its behavior through 
an XML file, which specifies the desired attributes of parameter values. An input value deviating 
from the expressed profile is considered an attack. However, the approach would generate false 
positive warnings as it does not consider page and path information to be more precise. 
 
Our work [30] is focused on web-based anomaly detection analyzing log files, based on the 
outlined work of Robertson et al. [31]. Both studies consider similar resource names to compare a 
new request with profiled requests to reduce false positive warnings. However, we apply 
information theoretic measures to compare entropy levels for parameter combinations and values. 
A comparison of each aforementioned study to our own objectives is provided in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Related Works on Anomaly-based IDS 
Author(s) Study summary Contrast with our study [30] 
Nascimento et al. 
[21] 
The work only considered GET requests 
and did not consider POST types of 
requests or response pages; Captured logs 
from a TShark tool and converted them to 
Common Log Format; The filtered data 
was generated by accessing sub-
applications 
We employ both server and client 
side tools to collect GET and POST 
data, combined them to form unified 
log files and processed them for 
defining good and bad datasets 
Cho et al. [22] Develop a Bayesian parameter estimation 
based anomaly detection approach from 
web server logs and showed that it 
outperformed signature-based tools such 
as SNORT; Assume a user visits a set of 
pages in a certain order 
Our approach relies on path 
resources and does not need to rely 
on the order in which a user visits 
different pages 
Ariu [23] Create a host-based IDS to protect web 
applications against attacks by employing 
the Hidden Markov Model (HMM). 
HMM is used to model a sequence of 
attributes and their values received by 
web applications 
Our approach is free from the state 
explosion problem that the HMM 
approach suffers from 
 
Park et al. [24] Analyze both GET and POST request data 
and capture the profiles of the data for 
each parameter; Apply the Needleman-
Wunch algorithm for a new parameter 
value to see if it would be accepted as part 
of the alarm generation process 
We employ entropy levels of 
parameter values for profiling and 
attack detection 
Le et al. [25] Create the DoubleGuard framework that 
examines web server and database server 
logs to detect attacks leaking confidential 
information 
Our study uses a similar framework, 
but aims to identify all potential 
attacks  
Vigna et al. [26] Reduce false positive warnings by 
combining web log anomaly detection and 
a SQL query anomaly detector; A request 
that was found to be anomalous would 
still be issued to a database server if the 
request is not accessing sensitive data 
We focus on web server logs and 
apply entropy measures to detect 
anomalous requests  
 
Ludinard et al. [27] Profile web applications by learning 
invariants (e.g., a user session should have 
same value as the login value); Then 
source code is instrumented to check for 
violation of invariants, which indicate 
anomalous input 
Our work does not rely on source 
code instrumentation 
 
Li et al. [28] Develop an anomaly-based IDS by 
decomposing web sessions into 
workflows of a set of atomic requests 
which may access one or more data 
objects; Apply the Hidden Markov Model 
We apply cross entropy of the 
parameter name, value, and types 
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Author(s) Study summary Contrast with our study [30] 
(HMM) to model the sequence of the data 
access of workflows 
Gimenez et al. [29] Use a web application firewall as an 
anomalous request detector and specifies 
the desired attributes of parameter values; 
This generates false positive warnings 
since it does not consider page and path 
information 
Our work does not rely on firewall 
policies and applies entropy 
measures to detect anomalous 
requests 
Robertson et al. [31] Similar resource names are used to 
compare new requests with profiled 
requests to reduce false positive warnings 
We apply information theoretic 
measures to compare entropy levels 
for parameter combinations and 
values 
 
2.3 Related Works: Information Theoretic Metrics 
The earliest work we are aware of in the literature is from Lee et al. [32]. In their work, the authors 
applied several metrics (entropy, relative entropy and conditional entropy) to model network log 
data to demonstrate anomalies. Similar to their work, we apply entropy to model web request 
parameter values. However, we explore the application of information theoretic metrics for web-
based anomaly detection. Shahriar et al. [33] apply entropy to detect vulnerable SQL queries in 
PHP web applications. Later they explore an information theory based dissimilarity metric 
(Kullback-Leibler Divergence) to detect XSS attacks in web applications [34]. The KLD measures 
have been explored to detect repackaged Android malware [36] and content provider leakage 
vulnerabilities [35]. Ozonat et al. [37] detect anomalies in performance metric behavior in large-
scale distributed web services applying information theoretic metrics. Below, Table 3 presents 
these works with additional details. 
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Table 3: Detecting Anomalies through Information Theoretic Metrics 
Author(s) Main Objective Metrics Used 
Lee et al. [32] Suggest how to build the correct anomaly 
IDS for audit datasets and measure the 
performance 
Entropy, Conditional Entropy, 
Relative Entropy, Information Gain 
and Information Cost 
Shahriar et al. [33] Discover PHP web applications that are 
vulnerable to SQL injection without 
relying on attack input 
Entropy 
Shahriar et al. [34] Implement malicious JavaScript code 
intentionally to find XSS attacks 
Kullback-Leibler Divergence 
Cooper et al. [35] Identify the source and the source code 
behind specific malicious functions of 
interest on Google’s Android mobile 
operating system 
Kullback-Leibler Divergence 
Shahriar et al. [36] Detect repackaged malware on an 
Android operating system to avoid end 
users from downloading applications with 
unexpected, malicious functionalities 
Kullback-Leibler Divergence 
Ozonat [37] Model the temporal and spatial 
relationships between various web 
services to find anomalies 
Relative Entropy 
 
2.4 Signature-Based Intrusion Detection 
A representative sample of literature works have developed signature-based IDSs [20, 38, 39, 40, 
41, 42].  The vast amount of research on this topic has focused on the network layer and multiple 
Denial of Service attacks. Each of the previously mentioned works has its own strengths, but all 
of the approaches have universal underlying limitations. First, in the literature, there is little wide-
spread coverage of the known web application layer attacks (see Table 4 for the levels we follow 
in this Chapter). Each study identified at least one of these types of attacks. Second, each of the 
related works have yet to attain zero false positive and false negative rates with only one exception.  
 
Finally, regardless of the type of attack the authors were searching for, each study only considered 
one type of log data for analysis. This paper addresses these limitations by discussing a signature-
based IDS framework to detect certain application layer attacks by analyzing data from multiple 
logs generated by web applications. The included signature-based IDS is meant to protect web 
applications. Table 4 shows various attack types at different levels and related work that proposed 
IDS. This Table was created based on industry-level data [44]. Our approach analyzes web server 
log data, trains an IDS using a GA, and detects three common web application attacks (Cross-Site 
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Scripting, SQL Injection and Remote File Inclusion attacks). The definitions and explanations of 
these attacks can be found in Section 2 of Chapter 4. In addition, the evaluation of previously 
collected normal data and newly created malicious data via this approach would provide a detailed 
view of the results. 
Table 4: Signature-based Attack Detection  
App Layer Attack Type Work(s) 
 
 
Application 
XSS [15, 19, 30, 41, 43] 
RFI [30, 43, 46] 
SQLI [12, 30, 43, 45] 
Brute-Force [13, 15, 40] 
Buffer Overflow [5] 
 CSRF [53] 
 Zero-days [38] 
 
Transport 
SYN/ACK [40] 
XMAS Scans [20] 
 DoS [5, 39] 
 Apache2 [42] 
 
Network 
Smurfs [20] 
Ping-of-Death [20] 
 SYN flooding [40] 
 
For our purposes, the network layer and the transport layer attacks in the Table 4 above are 
irrelevant. However, it serves to illustrate that attacks are diverse and can occur in other contexts 
outside of this case study. From the vast body of literature about signature-based IDSs, we classify 
the works in multiple ways. We look at benchmark data sources, the attributes of examined data, 
metrics employed by the IDS, the environment where implementation and evaluation was 
conducted, the types of attacks being covered, and reported performance rates (false positive and 
false negative rates). Among all the works, one study achieved detection of zero-day attacks by 
analyzing web and database server logs, and examining attack code, command payload and traffic 
generated by the payload [38]. Neelakantan et al. [39] used protocol information, headers, and 
packet payloads of packet captures to reduce the total number of false alarms from DDoS attacks. 
The rules defining the source address, destination address and destination port were used to 
increase the speed of signature detection in another study [40].  
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In [20], the signature of a priori algorithm from the MySQL database logs was proposed to detect 
known network level attacks. Based on PHP source code, Gupta et al. [41] used a controlled VM 
to detect XSS attacks achieving 0% FP and 0% FN rate. The authors of [42] used known SNORT 
and ClamAV signatures to detect signature-based attacks. Additionally, the researchers utilized a 
honeypot to collect data for a character frequency exclusive signature matching scheme and the 
Boyer-Moore algorithm was applied to the dataset. Through the use of Mail Exchange (MX) 
records on Windows servers, the authors of were able to brute-force into numerous Hotmail 
addresses [13]. In [5], Vigna et al. examined Apache logs to collect data on string length and 
sequence and exploited mutations to detect buffer overflows, directory traversals and other attacks.  
 
Chou [12] used web servers that were hosted in a Cloud environment to detect SQL injections, 
XSS, and brute-force attacks. Finally, in [15] the researchers looked at innerHTML properties such 
as GET, HTTP header and cookies to determine the presence of mutation-based XSS attacks, 
denoted as mXSS. This work, in contrast, uses logs collected from both the web server and the 
MySQL database for analysis. The environment is configured with a single host running multiple 
virtual machines (VMs) within a virtual cluster. Some of the VMs are running Windows while 
others are running Linux. We decided to use a signature matching scheme and added genetic 
operators to introduce changes into the signatures. Such mutation allowed for the GA to detect all 
of the known attack input. These include XSS, SQLI and RFI attacks and result in 0% false positive 
rate and 0% false negative rate. We outline the major points of each of these studies and compare 
them with our proposed approach, as shown in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5: Related Work on Signature Based Attack Detection Approaches 
Author 
Source of 
data/ 
benchmark 
Attributes 
of data 
examined 
Metrics used 
in their 
model 
Environment, 
configuration, 
virtual 
machines 
Attacks 
detected 
Effort to 
reduce alarm 
rates  
(FP and FN) 
Holm [38] Web servers 
and database 
servers 
Attack code, 
command 
payload, 
traffic 
generated by 
the payload 
% of known 
attacks 
detected 
Windows 
2000, XP, 
2003, Vista 
and Ubuntu 
10.04 
Zero-day 
Attacks 
False positives 
are mentioned, 
but no % is 
provided due 
to the variety 
of employed 
OS 
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Author 
Source of 
data/ 
benchmark 
Attributes 
of data 
examined 
Metrics used 
in their 
model 
Environment, 
configuration, 
virtual 
machines 
Attacks 
detected 
Effort to 
reduce alarm 
rates  
(FP and FN) 
Neelakantan 
et al. [39] 
Apache, 
OpenSSH, 
SMTP 
Protocol 
information, 
headers, and 
packet 
payloads of 
packet 
captures 
% of critical 
alarms 
generated  
Linux (Red-
Hat), Windows 
2003 and 
Windows 2000 
DDoS The article 
mentions that 
the total 
number of 
false alarms 
were reduced 
Krugel et al. 
[40] 
Web servers Rules 
defining the 
source 
address, 
destination 
address, and 
destination 
port 
Average 
increase in  
speed of 
signature-
detection 
Red-Hat Linux Brute-Force, 
Synscan, 
Portscan 
Not reported 
Modi et al. 
[20] 
MySQL 
database log 
Signature A 
priori 
Algorithm 
Proposed 
solution, not 
implemented 
thus far 
Eucalyptus on 
Ubuntu  
Known 
network 
attacks, DoS 
derivatives  
Propose a low 
FP rate 
Gupta et al. 
[41] 
PHP Source 
Code 
HTML 
Context 
including 
styles, body 
tag names, 
etc. 
Number of 
safe vs. 
unsafe files 
Controlled VM XSS attacks 0% FP and 0% 
FN rate 
Meng et al. 
[42] 
Honeypot Character-
frequency 
exclusive 
signature 
matching 
scheme and 
the Boyer-
Moore 
algorithm  
Maximum 
execution 
time variance 
using 
incoming 
payload or 
signature set 
partitions 
VMs in Cloud 
Environment 
Known 
SNORT and 
ClamAV 
signature-
based attacks 
Not 
mentioned; 
focused on 
reducing 
TIME to 
process 
signatures, not 
FP/FN rates 
Parwani et 
al. [13] 
MX records 
on Windows 
servers 
Expired 
Hotmail 
addresses  
Number of 
accounts that 
were hacked 
Windows Brute Force 
Attacks 
Not discussed 
Vigna et al. 
[5] 
Web 
servers, such 
as Apache 
String length 
and 
sequence, 
exploited 
mutations 
Number of 
signature-
based attacks 
detected by 
either 
SNORT or 
IIS 
RealSecure 
Linux, 
Windows, 
OpenBSD 
Buffer 
Overflows, 
DoS, Stack 
Overflow, 
DT, Double 
decoding 
(code 
execution), 
Did not 
consider 
FP/FN results 
because the 
goal was to 
provide useful 
indication 
about the 
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Author 
Source of 
data/ 
benchmark 
Attributes 
of data 
examined 
Metrics used 
in their 
model 
Environment, 
configuration, 
virtual 
machines 
Attacks 
detected 
Effort to 
reduce alarm 
rates  
(FP and FN) 
before and 
after 
mutating data 
Non-
exhaustive 
Signatures 
average 
quality of 
signatures 
under testing 
Chou [12] Web servers 
in the Cloud 
Data models 
categorized 
as SaaS, 
PaaS or IaaS 
Increased 
frequency of 
identified 
SQL 
injection 
attacks in 
SaaS, PaaS, 
and IaaS 
Cloud 
settings 
measured in 
% 
Linux, Solaris, 
Windows VMs 
in Cloud 
environment 
Malware 
(SQL) 
injection, 
other attacks 
detected with 
Cloud 
systems: 
DDoS, brute-
force, session 
hijacking, 
XSS, etc. 
Not discussed; 
focus was 
more on cloud 
security 
Heiderich et 
al. [15] 
Web servers innerHTML 
properties: 
GET, HTTP 
header, 
cookies, 
etc.; mXSS 
vectors 
Page load 
time in 
milliseconds 
versus the 
page size 
with and 
without the 
performance 
penalty 
introduced to 
users by 
TrueHTML  
VMs running 
Ubuntu  
Mutation-
based XSS 
attacks 
(mXSS) 
Briefly 
suggested as 
potential 
future 
research, but 
not directly 
addressed  
This study 
[43] 
Web servers 
MySQL 
database 
Signature 
matching 
scheme with 
added 
genetic 
mutations 
Mutation, 
selection, 
chromosome 
cross-overs 
VMs running 
Linux or 
Windows 
XSS, SQLI, 
RFI 
0% FP and 0% 
FN rate 
 
2.5  Genetic Algorithm 
Data sources and types of detected attacks vary greatly across the body of signature-based IDS 
literature. For example, in [48], Avancini et al. examined parameters and values of PHP code to 
find XSS attack vectors. These authors use static analysis of the Genetic Algorithm (GA) to 
automate the log analysis procedure. They also minimized the false positive and false negative 
alarms through path sensitization. Authors of [49] created their own set of suspicious data and used 
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the DARPA dataset as the normal dataset for their study. This study was the only study in the 
literature we encountered to use the DARPA dataset as a normal dataset. When comparing this 
GA-based IDS to a known signature database called Snort, the authors found that the GA-based 
IDS outperformed Snort by detecting a higher number of attacks and having a lower false alarm 
rate than Snort. Danana et al. [50] obtained all of their data from the KDD99 dataset, and were 
able to find attacks including Denial of Service, Probing, User-to-root and Remote-to-local attacks. 
A fuzzy genetic algorithm utilized in [51] pulled data from a six-by-six matrix of response-
resource entries to measure the parameters of the fitness function.  
 
A multivariate statistical clustering algorithm was suggested to detect web application attacks in 
[52]. The discrete variables in the study were measured by frequency and the number of similar 
characters between two separate activities (attacks) was suggested as a way to lower the number 
of false alarms. Liu and Fang genetically modified two sets of real numbers to shorten the lengths 
of the chromosomes to optimize the GA [53]. In another study, network attacks like smurf, 
teardrop, neptune, portsweep and others were identified in offline, normal audit data as well as in 
real time, processed data [53]. Normal data and attack data were compared by the authors looking 
for Denial of Service, Probes, User-to-root and Remote-to-local network-level attacks [54]. 
Authors of [55] lowered the false alarm rates by implementing an optimal genetic feature selection 
process and a support vector machine. Despite the potential of the existing signatures in the 
literature to detect patterns across any operating system, this work will use genetic operators to 
mutate such patterns for detection.  Table 6 summarizes these related works and the methods used 
by the authors to reach their conclusions. 
 
Table 6: Comparison of Related Work on Genetic Algorithms 
Author Source of data Metrics Types of 
attacks 
Effort to reduce 
alarm rates  
(FP and FN) 
Avancini et al. 
[48] 
Parameters and 
values of PHP 
code 
Integrating a static 
analysis of the genetic 
algorithm and taint 
analysis 
Cross-Site 
Scripting 
attack vectors 
FP and FN were 
minimized 
through path 
sensitization 
Barati et al. [49] Normal dataset 
(DARPA) and 
suspicious dataset 
Number of scan attacks 
detected/missed by this 
GA-based IDS versus 
Snort 
Horizontal 
and vertical 
scan attacks 
Overall false 
alarm rate was 
10% 
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Author Source of data Metrics Types of 
attacks 
Effort to reduce 
alarm rates  
(FP and FN) 
Danane et al. [50] KDD99 dataset Accuracy, execution 
time, memory allocation 
DoS, Probe, 
U2R, R2L 
Rules added in 
the testing phase 
to reduce FP and 
FN 
Fessi et al. [51] 6 by 6 binary 
matrix of 
response-resource 
entries 
Rules that only match 
anomalous connections 
to show signatures, 
parameters of fitness 
function 
Not specified; 
focused on 
the fitness 
value: attack 
impact ratio 
FP rate was 
“low” but not 
specified 
numerically  
Zhou et al. [52] Multivariate 
statistical 
clustering 
algorithm is 
suggested to 
detect attacks; No 
real data is used 
in the study 
Frequency for discrete 
variables; the number of 
similar characters 
between 2 activities 
Web-layer 
attacks under 
study, but 
none are 
specified 
Not disclosed 
but states the 
goal is “a very 
low rate” 
Liu et al. [53] Two sets of real 
numbers are 
genetically 
modified to 
shorten 
chromosome 
length 
Delphi method to 
determine Figure 1 in 
this article; fitness value 
of each chromosome, 
total fitness values, 
selection probability 
No attacks; 
discusses 
modified 
genetic 
algorithm for 
optimization 
No FP or FN; 
studied detection 
reliability (R), 
time of detection 
(T), and 
threshold time 
(S)  
Narsingyani et al. 
[54] 
Offline data for 
normal traffic 
dataset [audit 
data]; real time 
data for attack 
detection 
[Processed data] 
Src_bytes, land, 
wrong_fragment, [all 
numerical] and service 
[nominal] 
DoS attacks: 
smurf, pod, 
teardrop, 
Neptune, 
back, 
portsweep 
Specifically 
focused on FP 
rate to improve 
performance by 
increasing the 
number of rules 
Senthilnayaki et 
al. [55] 
Attack data and 
normal data 
Protocol type, service, 
src_bytes, flag, 
num_failed_logins, 
Logged_in, 
srv_diff_host_rate, 
dst_host_srv_count, 
is_guest_login, and 
num_shells 
DoS, Probe, 
U2R, R2L 
False alarms  
reduced by using 
optimal genetic 
feature selection 
and a support 
vector machine 
 
2.6 Benchmarking and Evaluation 
Work completed by Alhamazani et al. [56] proposes a benchmark named the Cross-Layer Multi-
Cloud Application Monitoring- and Benchmarking-as-a-Service (CLAMBS). This study used an 
Apache web server, a Tomcat web server and a MySQL database. The attack detection approach 
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worked across Windows and Linux environments, and was implemented to establish the baseline 
performance of applications while also monitoring each application’s quality of service (e.g., 
round trip time, packet loss). In this study, datasets of 50, 100 and 200 MB were generated on a 
virtual machine as a proof-of-concept to test Amazon Web Services and Windows Azure. 
However, this benchmark also had a heavy reliance on JAVA and specific reliability on cloud 
services. As described by [57], a study by Champion et al. [58] utilized an attack detector titled 
Ebayes by the authors. This detector was able to detect more attacks at the application layer than 
the commercially available intrusion detection system (IDS) in 2001. Despite this, Ebayes still 
only detected up to 50% of known attacks in the in-house generated dataset. Athanasiades et al. 
[57] also describe a study carried out in 1997 [59]. Through the use of customized software based 
on the Tool Command Language Distributed Program (TCL-DP) package, these authors simulated 
users performing FTP and/or Telnet procedures. A script was then created to record and replay the 
user actions to generate their dataset. These authors used a very controlled environment to ensure 
that the results of the study could be replicated. Aside from this precaution, the authors neglected 
to test their dataset for attack detection in a normal network environment. Instead, attack detection 
was only under study in the stress tests of the data [59]. 
 
Using a self-named benchmark, Ballocca et al. [60] created a fully integrated web stressing tool. 
The benchmark, called the Customer Behavior Model Graph (CBMG), relies on the stressing tool 
that is composed of a script recorder and a load generator. This allowed the traffic from the 
workload characterization to be automated and begin from the web log files. Generating this 
workload, on the other hand, is time consuming and involves multiple processes. The authors in 
[61] developed a unique algorithm to generate the Research Description Framework (RDF) 
benchmark. Generating datasets would no longer be an issue if RDF was adopted as a universal 
benchmark because the authors state that this generator can convert any dataset (real or fake) into 
a benchmark dataset. They can even make sure the user-specific data properties are generated. 
While this sounds like a potential solution, the authors also noted that the initial input data must 
first be cleaned and normalized. Neto et al. [62] took a trust-based approach to application-layer 
attack detection. By defining how likely vulnerabilities were to be found rather than determining 
a specific number of attacks that would be found, these authors measured the trustworthiness of 
the relationship between the application and the developer. As a new approach, this approach may 
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sound simple, but it is full of complex coding and involves a three step process. Anyone wishing 
to use this benchmark would require a fundamental understanding of how to read complex 
computer code. 
  
In [63], Neto et al. implemented Static Code Analysis as a benchmark for attack detection. Four 
metrics were applied to real web applications to determine the trustworthiness of the application. 
An application with a high mean score across each of the metrics was deemed untrustworthy. 
Despite these efforts, the benchmark relied on the TCP-App standard for web application code and 
JAVA. Stuckman et al. [64] crafted a modular benchmark on a testbed that automated the 
evaluation of an intrusion prevention system. This benchmark was a collection of modules and 
each module had an intentionally vulnerable application installed in an environment that would 
allow the application to run and simulate an attack. Each testbed was a deliverable virtual machine, 
so anyone could easily deploy the benchmark on any system running Debian Linux. The 
benchmark was limited in that it had to be customized for each individual developer if the 
developer wanted to generate their own attacks. Another benchmark for attack detection was made 
by Zhang et al. [65] in 2009. Known as WPBench, or Web Performance Benchmark for Web 2.0 
applications, this benchmark utilized a replay mechanism that was able to simulate user 
interactions with applications and characteristics of networks and servers. The benchmark worked 
well with Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Google Chrome browsers.  
 
Ultimately, this benchmark was intended to measure the responsiveness of each of the browsers to 
page loading times and event response times. The main disadvantage of this proposed benchmark 
was that is required users to run the benchmark in the background of their daily browsing activities 
and recorded their actions. This benchmark would then take more time to replay the actions in 
order to learn the user’s environment and preferences. A Model Driven Architecture (MDA) 
approach was proposed in [66] and allowed for the generation of repetitive and complicated 
infrastructure code by the benchmark tool. The MDA approach included a core benchmark 
application, a load testing suite and performance monitoring tools for the user. However, the 
approach did not include any type of tool to collect information regarding data performance. Yet 
another benchmark suggested in the literature is a web server benchmark named servload by the 
authors of the work [67]. This benchmark supports load balancing, can replay web server logs, 
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tells users the number of requests and sessions, as well as provide the connection time and error 
counts to the user. All of this information is very useful when trying to establish a standard for 
application-layer attack detection, but servload only supports GET requests and has to analyze 
web server logs. Varying log formats bring servload to a halt, impeding this benchmark from being 
universally adopted. We show the comparison and contrast among these literature works in Table 
7. Coupled with this summary, Table 8 highlights the specific data attributes that other authors 
measured to evaluate their datasets.  
 
Table 7: Summary of Related Literature on Benchmarking 
Author(s)  
Description of 
proposed new 
model or 
benchmark 
Advantages of 
method 
Disadvantages of 
method 
Size of the 
Dataset 
Alhamazani et 
al. [56] 
CLAMBS-Cross-
Layer Multi-Cloud 
Application 
Monitoring- and 
Benchmarking-as-
a-Service 
Monitors QoS of 
application 
 
QoS information of 
application 
components is shared 
across cloud layers 
 
Baseline performance 
established by  
B-a-a-S 
Study a proof-of-
concept on a VM 
testing Amazon AWS 
and Windows Azure 
 
Heavy reliance on 
JAVA 
Datasets of 
50MB, 100 
MB and 
200MB 
Athanasiades 
et al. [57] 
Environment 
similar to DARPA 
1998 
 
Ebayes detector 
[58] 
Detected more 
attacks than the 
commercially 
available IDS [58] 
Not publicly available 
(Privacy issues at 
Georgia Tech would 
not allow researchers 
to access their own 
subnet) 
Did not 
disclose the 
size of the 
dataset 
Same as above 
[57] 
 
Custom Software 
based on the 
Expect and Tool 
Command 
Language 
Distributed 
Program (TCL-
DP) package [59] 
Environment was 
very controlled to 
make sure the results 
could be replicated 
Attack identification 
only took place during 
stress tests 
Did not 
disclose the 
size of the 
dataset 
Ballocca et al. 
[60] 
Customer 
Behavior Model 
Graph (CBMG) 
Traffic from the 
workload 
characterization is 
automatic 
 
The characterization 
process begins from 
the web log files 
Creating a workload 
takes a lot of time and 
involves four different 
processes: merging 
and filtering web logs, 
getting sessions, 
transforming sessions, 
and CMBGs clustering 
No size given 
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Author(s)  
Description of 
proposed new 
model or 
benchmark 
Advantages of 
method 
Disadvantages of 
method 
Size of the 
Dataset 
Duan et al. 
[61] 
Research 
Description 
Framework (RDF) 
This generator can 
convert any real or 
fake dataset into a 
benchmark dataset 
and make data with 
similar characteristics 
as the real dataset 
with user-specific 
data properties 
Must perform data 
cleaning and 
normalization of the 
dataset before using 
this method 
User can 
indicate 
dataset size 
Neto et al.[62] Trust-based 
benchmark with 5 
metrics: Code 
Average Code 
Prudence,  Code 
Average Code 
Carelessness,  
Quality, Hotspot 
Prudence 
Discrepancy and  
Hotspot 
Carelessness 
Discrepancy 
Defining how likely 
vulnerabilities are to 
be found rather than 
the number of 
vulnerabilities 
Anyone using this 
benchmark method 
would have to 
understand how to 
read code 
No set size of 
data 
Neto et al.[63] Static Code 
Analysis 
Applies all 4 metrics 
to real web 
applications; higher 
metric values mean 
the product is less 
trustworthy 
Relies on TCP-App 
standard for code on 
web applications 
instead of developing 
their own 
 
JAVA heavy 
Not disclosed 
Stuckman et 
al. [64] 
Run a modular 
benchmark on a 
testbed that 
automates the 
evaluation of the 
IPS 
Testbed can be given 
out as a VM, so 
anyone can deploy it 
with Debian Linux 
Need to make this 
customizable for 
individual developers 
to generate their own 
attacks 
Resulting size 
of code; not 
specified 
Zhang et al. 
[65] 
WPBench: Web 
Performance 
Benchmark for 
Web 2.0 
applications 
Replay mechanism 
simulates user 
interactions with 
applications and 
characteristics of 
servers and networks 
Requires users to run 
the benchmark in the 
background of daily 
browsing to create a 
recording of steps to 
replay so the 
benchmark learns the 
environment and user 
preferences 
38MB 
32 
 
 
Author(s)  
Description of 
proposed new 
model or 
benchmark 
Advantages of 
method 
Disadvantages of 
method 
Size of the 
Dataset 
Zhu et al. [66] Model Driven 
Architecture 
(MDA) approach 
Generates repetitive 
and complicated 
infrastructure code 
No tools are included 
to collect data 
performance 
 
Claim a large 
amount of 
data, but not 
specific 
Zinke et al. 
[67] 
Web Server 
Benchmark named 
servload 
Can replay web 
server logs, tells 
users the # of 
requests, sessions, 
connect time, and 
error counts; error 
counts may be 
connection errors, 
HTTP codes, or # of 
timeouts 
Web server logs have 
to be analyzed and log 
formats can limit this 
feature 
 
Only supports GET 
requests 
No dataset 
size 
 
 
 
Table 8: Measured Data Attributes for Benchmarking 
Author(s)  Attributes discussed 
Alhamazani et al. 
[56] 
Worked on Windows and Linux 
Monitoring agent used SNMP, HTTP, SIGAR and custom built APIs 
Benchmarking component measured QoS parameters like network 
bandwidth, download and upload speeds, and latency 
Web server: Apache Tomcat 
Database Server: MySQL 
Athanasiades et al. [57] 
 
Generated traffic like DARPA 1998 [58] 
FTP server was the “victim” 
Used attack injection programs and in-house tools 
Attack effectiveness measured by number of hung connections at the 
victim server 
Percentage of detected hosts were measured (ranged from 25-50%) 
[58] 
Same as above [57] Simulated users performing Telnet and/or FTP operations [59] 
Script was used to record and reply the user actions to generate data 
Some attacks used: password files being sent to remote hosts, 
password cracking, elevating user access, password dictionary 
Ballocca et al. [60] Fully integrated web stressing tool 
Workloads were extracted from web log files 
Stressing tool was made up of a script recorder and a load generator 
Duan et al. [61] TPC Benchmark H  (19 GB) was used as the baseline for this 
generator 
The authors created a unique algorithm to generate a benchmark 
Neto et al. [62] Measured the trustworthiness of the relationship between the 
application and the developer 
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Author(s)  Attributes discussed 
A 3 step process: user sent parameters (i.e., session token) to the 
server and identified a target resource, server processes code, server 
sent back output like a form or html text 
Neto et al. [63] Raw number of vulnerabilities reported 
Calibrated number of vulnerabilities reported 
Normalized raw number of vulnerabilities reported 
Normalized calibrated number of vulnerabilities reported 
Stuckman et al. [64] Benchmark was a collection of modules that were each within a 
vulnerable application in an environment that let the application run 
and simulated an attack against the application 
Zhang et al. [65] Worked with Internet Explorer, Firefox or Chrome 
Measured responsiveness of  browsers to page loading times and 
event response times 
Zhu et al. [66] Included a core benchmark application, a load testing suite, and 
performance monitoring tools 
Zinke et al. [67] Supported load balancing  
Did not ignore think times or different user sessions 
Generated higher workloads than SURGE with similar statistical 
characteristics through 1 of 3 methods: multiply, peak, or score 
method 
 
In the next Chapter, we discuss anomaly intrusion detection, and our proposed technique to 
increase the attack detection rate.  
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Chapter 3: Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection System 
Development 
 
3.1 Overview 
This Chapter introduces the anomaly Intrusion Detection System (IDS) development and discusses 
some relevant work on anomaly IDS development in Section 3.2. Next, in Section 3.3 we introduce 
the idea of detecting web application attacks by using cross-entropy metrics. Section 3.4 explains 
our proposed approach to detect such attacks using web application log data based on our previous 
publication [30]. Finally, Section 3.5 shows how we compared our measures to other accepted 
measures.  
 
3.2 Related Explanation of Anomaly-Based IDS Development 
A recent report from Imperva [68] shows many applications have been targeted to exploit known 
vulnerabilities such as SQL Injection (SQLI), Remote File Inclusion (RFI), Directory Traversal 
(DT), and Cross Site Scripting (XSS). SQL injection attacks attempt to provide part of a SQL 
query in a web request URL (parameter value) where the query part is intended to change the 
structure of the query to introduce anomalous behaviors [69]. Remote File Inclusion [70] adds 
arbitrary server-side source files to introduce unwanted application behaviors. A directory 
traversal attack [71] supplies arbitrary traversing of directory commands in supplied URLs. XSS 
attacks inject arbitrary JavaScript code and occur when unsanitized inputs are passed within 
request URLs and are accepted by applications and processed or stored [72]. The vulnerability 
may arise from plugins the application uses during runtime, for example. One million Wordpress 
websites have been reported to be vulnerable to SQLI due to leak of secret keys from associated 
plugins [73]. Similarly, security protocols used by web applications can play the role for successful 
exploitation (e.g., heart bleed bug exploited to reveal secret information from web servers [74]).  
 
IDS is a popular approach to prevent attacks. IDS can be classified into two types based on the 
location of deployment: host-based (where one host or computer is protected) and network-based 
(where a set of hosts connected to a network is protected). This work considers development of a 
host-based IDS. Depending on the type of detection, an IDS can apply signatures of known attacks. 
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For example, Snort and Bro are two popular signature-based IDS. Both of these signature-based 
IDS have currently available signatures to detect web-based attacks such as SQLI and XSS [38, 
75]. However, the limitation of an established signature-based IDS is that they are not suitable for 
detecting new attacks and it is common to see attackers devise new signatures to bypass IDS 
detection [39, 40]. To address this limitation, anomaly-based IDS have been getting much attention 
from the research community [5, 12, 15, 39, 40].  
 
An anomaly-based IDS has learning and detection phases. During the learning phase, it learns 
profiles of normal web requests and then compares with a new request to find the dissimilarity 
level. If the level exceeds a certain threshold level, an attack is detected. Anomalous IDS has the 
advantage of detecting new attacks, but at the cost of a high number of incorrect detections. Thus, 
it is important to explore approaches to reduce the number of warnings. Most of the anomaly-
based IDS analyzing web logs from the literature [5, 12, 15, 39, 40] primarily analyzes GET 
requests, and do not consider POST requests. These POST requests include parameter and value 
information that should be considered for profiling of requests. Some existing approaches require 
the knowledge of source code level information to reduce the number of false warning [5, 20, 39, 
43].  However, source code may not be accessible while developing an IDS. 
 
In contrast to earlier works, our approach relies on path resources (e.g., a request page in a certain 
path) and does not need to rely on similar assumptions of the other works. We place the emphasis 
on web server logs and apply entropy measures to detect anomalous requests. Our work employs 
cross entropy levels of parameter name, value, and types for profiling and attack detection. 
 
3.3 Detection of Web Application Attacks with Cross-Entropy 
Our approach is motivated by earlier works that apply information theoretic measures. For our 
study, we created the framework of the web anomaly IDS for the learning phase. A browser is 
used to run deployed web applications and access resource pages with benign input, as illustrated 
in Figure 1.  All GET requests from the browser get logged into the web server log files. For POST, 
we deploy a suitable browser extension (Firebug for Firefox [76]). We combine the POST request 
data with GET request data during offline analysis by the anomaly detector. The anomaly detector 
learns request profiles based on resource paths.  
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Figure 1: Information-theoretic IDS Framework 
 
Figure 2 shows two example requests (we display part of the log due to space constraint) that we 
gather during dataset generation by deploying a large scale web application named Joomla [77]. 
The first request is intended to access the resource /joomla/index.php, and has the list of parameters 
such as option, view, task, id, timeout with associated values com_installer, update, update.ajax, 
6, and 3600. The second request accesses the same resource as the first one. However, it has one 
parameter (option) with the value com_media. Therefore, applications may let a user access the 
resource path with various sets of parameters and values. Solely relying on the parameter sequence 
would not be enough to detect attacks where the sequence remains the same (e.g., SQL Injection). 
We also find that the value of id is related to the user account, and the type of the parameter usually 
remains as numeric with no upper or lower bound.  
 
/joomla/index.php?option=com_installer&view=update&task=update.ajax&id=6&skip=700&ti
meout=3600… … 
/joomla/index.php?option=com_media … 
Figure 2: Example of Log Data 
 
For each of the common paths, the anomaly detector profiles three types of information: parameter 
set, parameter value set and parameter value data type. To account for all of these variations within 
parameters and their values, our proposed detection approach employs three types of measures. 
We now present the processing of each request that appears in a log file in Algorithm 1. 
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Algorithm 1: Processing of URLs from a log file 
 
 
Line 2 identifies the resource path and adds to the R set if not included already (Lines 3-4). Line 5 
extracts the list of parameters from the request. For each of the parameters (Lines 6-10), we obtain 
the value (Line 7) and type of data (Line 8). Then, we update occurrences of the value and type at 
Lines 9 and 10, respectively. Finally, Line 11 updates parameter occurrence. 
 
3.4 Case Study and Evaluation 
We apply entropy as the metric to profile the randomness of parameter occurrences, parameter 
values, and value types. The entropy (H) is calculated using the formula in Equation (i). Here, Q 
is a set of symbols (unique values passed in the parameter), where qi is the i
th element, p(qi) 
indicates the occurrence probability of qi
th element.  
 
  H(Q) =-E[logP(Q)] = -Ʃq£Q(q = qi) log2 P (q=qi) … … (i)   
 
Since entropy is useful for a single set of frequency distribution, it cannot be directly applied to 
compare two distributions (i.e., a new request and a set of earlier observed requests). Instead, we 
apply a cross-entropy measure between two distributions. Cross entropy (CE) [78, 79] between 
two distributions p and q is shown in Equation (ii). Here, p(xi) is the probability of xith element’s 
occurrence.  
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  CE (p, q) = - Ʃi p(xi) * log2(q(xi)) … … … (ii)   
 
In Equation (ii), p(xi) is the probability of xith element from p set, and q(xi) is the probability of 
xith element from q set. CE becomes minimal when p and q are identical. The CE between two 
probability distributions measures the average number of bits needed to identify an event from a 
set of possibilities. We define a threshold level d which, if exceeded, would flag a new request as 
anomalous. If the CE does not exceed threshold, we consider it normal request. For web anomaly 
detection, we deploy three measures: cross-entropy of parameter (CEP), cross-entropy of value 
(CEV), cross-entropy of type (CET). CEP is intended to measure the missing parameter or 
additional parameters injected as part of attacks or tampering. Equation (iii) shows CE between 
two parameter sets P1 and P2 for a given resource path r. We apply a back off smoothing algorithm 
[80] to avoid the zero occurrence of any parameter by replacing zero with a very small probability 
value (as the logarithm of zero probability cannot be computed, otherwise). 
 
          CEPr (P1, P2) = - Ʃi P1(xi) * log2(P2(xi)) … … … (iii)   
 
CEV is intended for a given parameter’s observed values during the training. It compares the 
distribution of earlier observed values and the values present in a new request. It can capture any 
deviation between anomalous attack inputs with an earlier observed normal input. Equation (iv) 
shows the CEV between V1 (values observed during profiling) and V2 (value observed during 
testing) for a given parameter p. 
 
        CEVp (V1,V2) = - Ʃi V1(xi) * log2(V2(xi)) … … … (iv)   
 
CET is intended to reduce false positives as well as increase attack detection. It observes the 
deviation between data type of the supplied parameter values and a new request parameter value 
type. Equation (v) shows CET between type set T1 and T2 for a given resource path r. 
 
        CETr (T1, T2) = - Ʃi T1(xi) * log2(T2(xi)) … … … (v)   
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These metrics were applied to both of the datasets in our study, the training dataset and the testing 
dataset. For the training phase, we deploy a large scale PHP Content Management System (Joomla 
[77]) and perform various functionalities for a four day period. For each day, various types of 
inputs have been applied to different pages and the logs are stored. We ensured that the data does 
not contain any malicious input by manually inspecting the logs. We then use the first day of data 
to build a normal profile of requests and then validate for false positive rates for the subsequent 
three days of datasets. Table 9 shows the number of GET and POST requests for all four days. We 
combine all the data, and then choose 25% of the data randomly for building profiles, while 
keeping the remaining 75% of the data for testing.  
 
Table 9: Good Dataset Characteristics 
Request Type Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 
GET 1,013 1,556 1,640 1,536 
POST 412 517 511 481 
Total 1,425 2,073 2,151 2,017 
 
We gather attack input from various sources [81-83] and apply them to the deployed application 
to generate the attack dataset. Table 10 shows the number of samples we applied in our attack 
dataset generation. These attack inputs are applied randomly within web requests from the 
browser.  
Table 10: Distribution of Attack Inputs 
Attack type # of samples 
SQLI [83] 1000 
DT [71, 82] 8 
RFI [70] 5 
XSS [81] 60 
Total 1073 
 
When the IDS generates a warning we call it positive, if it is real, we call it True Positive (TP). If 
no warning is generated we call it negative, if it is actually not a malicious request, we call it True 
Negative (TN). If the IDS misses the actual attack detection, we call it False Negative (FN). We 
follow similar approaches [39, 40] to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach. We use 
a Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve to evaluate the performance of the anomaly 
IDS. It has two measures: True Positive Rate (TPR) on the y axis, and False Positive Rate (FPR) 
on the x axis. TPR and FPR are defined as follows:  
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      TPR = TP/(TP+FN)  … … … (viii)               FPR=FP/(FP+TN)     … … … (ix)   
 
Ideally, we expect IDS to demonstrate a TPR of 100%, while FPR would be 0%. The filtered 
(normal and attack input free) data is used to evaluate an IDS to produce FPR, whereas the dataset 
containing only attack requests would be used to obtain TPR. Table 11 shows that the lowest FPR 
is observed for CEV (0.53%) while the highest FPR is for the CET (3.6%). The lowest TPR 
observed is 83.66 (CEP) while the highest TPR is obtained for all measures when considering 
higher threshold levels (d>8). The raw results are presented in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: FPR and TPR for the Proposed Measures 
d 
CEP CEV CET 
FPR(%) TPR(%) FPR(%) TPR(%) FPR(%) TPR(%) 
d >2 0.54 83.66 0.53 90.22 1.2 94.21 
d >4 1.1 92.45 1.45 94.53 1.45 95.67 
d>6 1.26 98.67 1.67 99.33 2.56 98.67 
d>8 2.56 100 1.92 100 3.6 100 
 
Data from Table 11 is also below in Figure 3. The Figure shows the ROC curve of performance 
for the IDS for various distance (d) values. In this graph, the x axis shows FPR (%) and the y axis 
shows TPR (%). We find that a higher detection accuracy is achieved at the cost of a higher FPR. 
Among CEP, CEV, and CET, the best performance is shown by CEV as it has the lowest FPR. 
 
 
Figure 3: ROC Curve of various Cross Entropy Metrics 
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3.5 Comparison of Related Metrics 
We compare our approach with two earlier proposed approaches: value length and Mahalanobis 
distance [31]. The length of a parameter value should be limited in size. However, for an attack 
request, it may be higher. We compute mean and variance of length during training and testing. 
We measure the deviation based on Chebyshev's inequality (calculating the probability that an 
attribute would have the observed length) [84]. Let X be a random variable with mean µ and 
standard deviation s >0. Then the Chebyshev Inequality is shown as follows (k>0):  
 
       P(|X-µ| >= ks) ≤ 1/k2 … … …  (vi)   
 
Mahalanobis Distance (MD) [85] is a metric to compare two statistical distributions. It indicates 
how close a given distribution is to observed distributions. If we assume the two groups are x (x1, 
x2, …xn) and y (y1, y2, … yn). Then MD between x and y is defined as follows:  
 
       MD(x, y) = sqrt ((x-y)T*S-1 *(x-y)) … … … (vii)   
 
Sqrt is the square root operation, (x-y)T is the transpose of the difference between x and y, S-1 is the 
inverse of co-variance matrix S. We adopt the length measures and consider the length of the 
parameter name, and the value and consider k=4 for Chebyshev inequality. For MD, we form 
groups based on parameter, value, and type (e.g., each unique parameter, value, or type is labeled 
with a numeric value, for example, a data type for number is 1, while string is 2). The following 
ROC curves (Figures 4, 5 and 6) compare CE measures from our case study with length and MD-
based anomaly detection approaches. We find CEP performs better than length and MD. 
 
Figure 4: Comparison between CEP, length and MD measures 
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Figure 5: Comparison between CEV, length and MD measures 
 
 
Figure 6: Comparison between CET, length and MD measures 
 
Among the three measures (CEP, CEV, CET), CEV performs best followed by CEP and CET 
when compared with length and MD measures. CEV accounted for payload diversity more than 
the other two measures. In all cases, we find that the cross entropy measure performs better than 
two other existing anomaly detection measures. As anomaly detection measures become more 
capable of detecting advanced web application attacks, the signature-based approach to attack 
detection must also be investigated. 
 
The next Chapter discusses how a signature-based IDS can work with a genetic algorithm and 
improve attack detection. Another case study will also be included.  
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Chapter 4: Signature-Based Intrusion Detection System 
Development 
 
4.1 Overview 
In this Chapter, we establish our methodology for creating a genetic algorithm that is applicable 
to signature-based intrusion detection in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we describe how datasets are 
generated and applied. Finally, Section 4.4 presents our case study and results.  
 
Traditional Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) use signatures where attacks are defined as a 
sequence of events to match with network traffic [86]. This approach is accurate as long as the list 
of attacks is known in advance and signatures are defined before deploying an IDS such as Snort 
[87] and Bro [88]. There has been little effort to develop signature-based IDS for web applications. 
Moreover, they rely on regular expressions to detect attacks. For example, a script created to use 
a PHPIDS [89] allows attack signatures to be expressed using a set of regular expressions. The 
burden is on the user to keep up with new expressions. To address this limitation of a signature-
based IDS, in this paper, we propose to develop a Genetic Algorithm (GA) based IDS. GA-based 
approaches have gained the attention of the research community in recent years. In a signature-
based attack detection approach, the network traffic is monitored and the IDS searches for 
malicious behaviors that match the known signatures [4]. Any signatures with even minor 
deviations from the attack descriptions would not set off any security alarms, which may leave a 
system vulnerable [38]. However, a GA-based approach can address this limitation by generating 
new signatures from existing signatures. We explored this idea and carried out a case study [42] 
to exemplify how a GA can improve attack detection rates as well.  
 
4.2 Creation of a Genetic Algorithm 
Within this Section, we explain how to create a genetic algorithm, based on previous literature. 
Generally speaking, a genetic algorithm advances a set of solutions by combining good solutions 
to craft new ones until the best solution is found. This process is composed of multiple steps [90-
93]. In order to generate a genetic algorithm, a general process and set of steps can be followed. 
The first step is to create an initial population. This population is typically generated in a random 
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manner and may include as many individuals as preferred, from a few to several thousand. An 
individual is also called a chromosome in the population. Each chromosome in the initial 
population is then evaluated for fitness. Next, a new population has to be created. This process 
consists of repeating the steps that use genetic operators, including selection, crossover and 
mutation, until the new population is established.  
 
During the selection phase, the main goal is to keep the best individuals in the population and 
improve the overall population fitness. Two parent chromosomes are selected from the population 
based on their fitness score value. The better the fitness score is, the more likely that the 
chromosome will be selected for the population. Crossing over, or the sharing of information, takes 
place between two parents to create new offspring or children. This occurs in hopes of crossing 
two chromosomes with a high fitness value that will then create an offspring that has the best traits 
from each parent chromosome. When mutations occur, there are random changes that happen in 
individual genes. This increases the diversity among the initial population over multiple 
generations. All of the new offspring are placed into a new population and serve as the base 
population for the next iteration of the genetic algorithm. Genetic algorithms are used to create 
repetitive populations until the optimum solution for the population is found or the population’s 
end condition is reached [91-93]. The genetic algorithm steps are outlined in Figure 7. 
 
1. Begin with a random set of solutions (represented by chromosomes) to form population. 
2. Evaluate the fitness of each chromosome in the population. 
3. Create new solution by using genetic operators (selection, cross over) by selecting 
chromosomes having higher fitness level.  
4. Apply mutations randomly on newly generated chromosomes.  
5. Repeat steps 2-4 until we reach maximum number of iterations, or exceed population size. 
 Figure 7: Steps of Genetic Algorithm 
 
 
4.3 Dataset Generation for GA-Based IDS Development and Application 
As our goal is to apply the GA to improve a signature-based IDS, we start with an attack dataset 
that we generated by deploying a large scale PHP web application named Joomla [77]. The 
applications interacted automatically using scripts, and were provided with malicious inputs. We 
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collected inputs from the sources such as OWASP [94]. These attack inputs are applied randomly 
within web requests from a browser. Table 12 displays the number of each type of attack that was 
distributed into the attack dataset. The Apache web server logs were referenced to manually detect 
successful attacks. Figure 8 shows an example of log data for a SQL injection attack where an 
input field (id) has a tautology attack encoded in hexa-decimal format. Similarly, Figure 9 shows 
an example of log data for an XSS attack where an image source has been supplied with malicious 
code. Finally, Figure 10 shows an example of log data for a RFI attack, where the FORMAT field 
is included with an include statement pointing to a file source from an attacker-controlled website, 
followed by an exit() command. 
 
Table 12: Distribution of Attack Input Data 
Attack type # of samples 
SQLI 1000 
RFI 5 
XSS 60 
Total 1073 
 
"GET 
/sqlinj/?id=1%27+or+%271%27+%3D+%271%27%29%29%2F*&Submit=Submit&user_token
=c14e5f424d9f279c19ba507492745d50… 
Figure 8: Example Log Data for SQL Injection Attack 
 
 
"GET 
/xss_r/?name=%3CIMG+SRC%3DJaVaScRiPt%3Aalert%28%26quot%3BXSS%26quot%3B%
29%3E&user_token=f37e5a82a994725092fd3155bb8cffba… 
Figure 9: Example Log Data for XSS Attack 
 
 
“GET /?FORMAT={${include("http://www.verybadwebsite.com/hacker.txt")}}{${exit()}}… 
Figure 10: Example Log Data for RFI Attack 
 
 
Step 1: The GA accepts a set of chromosomes as input, and provides another set of chromosomes 
as outputs after a certain number of iterations while following the fitness evaluation, cross over 
and mutations. For our contribution, we first convert each of the GET requests to a chromosome, 
which is a bit string representation. Figure 11 shows an example representation of a chromosome 
for SQL injection attack (based on the log in Figure 8 above). Here, we have three blocks of 
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information that include total number of SQL keywords (two of them include OR, =), presence of 
an encoded character (1=Yes, 0=No), number of input fields that have SQL keywords (one field 
here has a SQL keyword). The last block is the decision block, which represents attack type, 
expressed in four bits. In the literature, there are six common types of SQL injection attacks. 
Hence, we reserve three bits to express various types of attacks. 
 
# of SQL 
keywords 
Presence of 
encoded character 
# of fields with 
SQL keyword 
Attack 
type 
010 1 001 0001 
Figure 11: Example of a Chromosome (C1) for SQL Injection 
 
Since each chromosome length should be same across different types of attacks, we define 
chromosomes for XSS and RFI using three blocks of bit representation, followed by attack type 
information. Figure 12 shows an example of chromosome for XSS based on the XSS log data 
described earlier. Here, three script/html words are present (<script>, <img>, </script>), the input 
is encoded, and one field has XSS keywords. Figure 13 shows an example of RFI chromosome 
based on the RFI log data presented, where the attack payload includes one URL, and it was not 
encoded. There is only one command included for this situation. Once each attack has the 
appropriate binary string, Step 2 can begin.  
 
# of script/html 
keywords 
Presence of 
encoded character 
# of fields with 
XSS keyword 
Attack type 
011 1 001 0111 
Figure 12: Example of a Chromosome (C2) for XSS Attack 
 
# of URLs Encoded # of commands Attack type 
001 0 001 1100 
Figure 13: Example of a Chromosome (C3) for RFI Attack 
 
Steps 2 and 3: We define two fitness functions (FF2, FF3) to evaluate chromosome x as follows 
(Equation (i) to (iii)).  
 
FF1(x): # of attacks detected by x in training dataset/total # of attacks in training data … … (i) 
FF2(x): # of attacks detected by x in testing dataset/total # of attacks in testing data … … (ii) 
FF3(x): FF1(x) + FF2(x) … … … (iii) 
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For example, we can apply FF3 to evaluate the fitness value of a SQLI chromosome (C1). If we 
assume that C1 matches with 1 attack input out of 100 samples, and results in no false positive 
warning, then its fitness value is 0.01. When we are evaluating the fitness function for a 
chromosome, we are considering the entire dataset including training and testing. We compare bit 
level representation of chromosomes from training or testing data to determine how many attacks 
are detected. The chromosomes are crossed over based on fitness level.  We apply one point cross 
over for this case study. For instance, if we decide to cross over between C1 and C2, the before 
and after results would mimic those added below. If we assume in C1 (after cross over), the fourth 
bit gets mutated from 1 to 0, then we have a new signature (01000010111) for XSS, where the 
attack payload is not encoded. This cross over process is illustrated below as well. 
 
Before cross over (C1, C2): 
C1 010 1 00  1 0001 
C2 011 1 00  1 0111 
 
After cross over (C1, C2): 
C1 010 1 00  1 0111 
C2 011 1 00  1 0001 
 
Step 4: Our proposed framework allows for the web log data to be converted to chromosomes, as 
demonstrated. The GA is then applied to generate more chromosomes which act as new attack 
signatures until the solution is achieved. The generic framework we applied is shown below in 
Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14: GA-Based IDS Framework 
 
4.4 Case Study and Evaluation 
In this Section, we evaluate our approach in multiple ways. First, the GA parameters were 
evaluated. We divide our attack dataset (web log files) into two parts: training dataset (30%) and 
testing dataset (70%). This division is based on some earlier literature work that also developed a 
GA-Based classifier (see Table 3). For each of the training dataset logs, we convert GET or POST 
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requests into chromosome representations by editing and implementing a number of open source 
PHP class files [95]. Figure 15 shows a screenshot of the application output used while evaluating 
this approach on a Windows Computer. 
 
 
Figure 15: Screenshot of Results from GA-Based IDS 
 
 
Based on the variables involved, such as the mutation rates, fitness functions and cross overs, 
multiple scenarios were carried out to evaluate our approach. These results are depicted in this 
Section. Figure 16 shows attack detection accuracy for various population sizes while using FF2 
as the fitness function and keeping the mutation rate at 0.5. We can observe that the higher the 
selection rate for a chromosome to cross over, the better accuracy for attack detection capability 
we achieve. Figure 17 shows the attack detection accuracy for various population sizes while using 
FF3 as the fitness function and keeping the mutation rate at 0.7. Each chromosome had varying 
selection rates, which makes it easy to see that attacks are detected with more accuracy as the 
population size increases and the selection rate increases. 
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Figure 16: Attack Detection Accuracy vs. Population Size (FF2, mutation rate=0.5) 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Attack Detection Accuracy vs. Population Size (FF3, mutation rate=0.7) 
 
 
Figure 18 demonstrates that as mutation rate changes, so does the accuracy of attack detection. 
Here, the selection rate was set at 10% and FF2 was used as the fitness function. A higher mutation 
rate implies that the attacks can be detected with more accuracy and within a smaller population. 
Figure 19 illustrates that as mutation rate increases, so does the attack detection accuracy. For this 
situation, FF3 was used as the fitness function and the selection rate was set at 20%. A higher 
mutation rate shows that the attacks can be detected with more accuracy and in a smaller 
population.  
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Figure 18: Attack Detection Accuracy vs. Mutation Rate (FF2, selection rate=10%) 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Attack Detection Accuracy vs. Mutation Rate (FF3, selection rate=20%) 
 
Despite obtaining the expected results, we continued with our case study a step further. We 
compared the GA-Based IDS with PHPIDS [89], which is a popular open source web application 
level attack detector. PHPIDS relies on a set of regular expressions in a configuration file to detect 
known signatures. Such regular expressions are the signatures of each attack under study. 
Therefore, by testing a known attack dataset, we compare GA with PHPIDS. Figures 20-22 below 
illustrate samples of the regular expressions provided in PHPIDS for XSS, SQLI and RFI. In 
Figure 20, any script code can be detected that is pre or post pended with an arbitrary string 
(“(?:\<scri)|(<\w+:\w+)]”). It can also detect data having possible scripts (other than <strong> tag). 
Similarly, Figure 21 shows an example regular expression that is supposed to detect SQL injection 
attack inputs having specific keywords (e.g., exists, type). Figure 22 shows an example of a regular 
expression for remote file inclusion that looks for a php file. 
 
<![CDATA[(?:\<\w*:?\s(?:[^\>]*)t(?!rong)) | (?:\<scri)|(<\w+:\w+)]]>   
Figure 20: Regular Expression for Cross-Site Scripting 
 
51 
 
 
<![CDATA[(?:\[\$(?:ne|eq|lte?|gte?|n?in|mod|all|size|exists|type|slice|or)\])]]> 
Figure 21: Regular Expression for SQL Injection 
 
<![CDATA[(?:@[\w]+\s*\()|(?:]\s*\(\s*["!]\s*\w)|(?:<[?%](?:php)?.*(?:[?%]>)?)|(?:;[\s\w|]*\$\w
+\s*=)|(?:\$\w+\s*=(?:(?:\s*\$?\w+\s*[(;])|\s*".*"))|(?:;\s*\{\W*\w+\s*\()]]> 
Figure 22: Remote File Inclusion Example 
 
To compare the GA-Based IDS with PHPIDS, we consider the population set generated by GA 
and then convert back to string representation of attack inputs. We then pass these inputs to 
PHPIDS and see if all of them can be detected by PHPIDS. Figures 23 and 24 show example 
performances of the PHPIDS. In both cases, as the GA generated a greater population (of 
signatures), the PHPIDS failed to detect all of them. Thus, a GA can be complementary to a 
PHPIDS to detect new attacks using a signature-based approach. 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Performance of PHPIDS for GA Generated Signatures (cross over rate=10%, 
mutation rate=0.5) 
 
 
Figure 24: Performance of PHPIDS for GA Generated Signatures (cross over rate=20%, 
mutation rate=0.7) 
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The initial results find that the use of a GA is promising and can act as complementary to other 
existing signature-based IDS approaches. When the population size of chromosomes is increased 
(representing rules), the better the GA achieves the capability of detecting new attacks. Further, 
having increased selection rate and mutation rate, we can generate new attack detection rules that 
can address the limitation of traditional signature-based IDSs, such as the PHPIDS. 
 
In the next Chapter, a broad summary of benchmark evaluation is presented and applied to a 
selection of the previous log files. 
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Chapter 5: Benchmark for Evaluation 
 
5.1 Overview 
Technologists and computer scientists need a set of standards, called a benchmark, to evaluate the 
datasets they handle on a daily basis that may be made up of log files generated by user actions, 
web applications, and login attempts. These types of datasets may vary in size, content, purpose, 
and many other characteristics. However, all of the datasets should be able to be evaluated by the 
same benchmark. For the purposes of this chapter, we consider a benchmark to be a set of data 
obtained from real world applications and that can be used to measure performance of web 
application attack detection tools. The benchmark could be used to detect how resistant an 
application is towards detecting attacks and performance changes [96, 97]. Benchmarking can be 
carried over into almost any domain of technology; however, this chapter focuses on developing a 
benchmark for detecting attacks against web applications. 
 
5.2 Description of a Benchmark 
A benchmark can be applied to nearly any situation in the technology field. Based on the literature 
dating back to 1997 and as far forward as 2015, this section will explain why the need for one 
collective benchmark is a relevant issue. Strictly by definition, any attack aimed at the application 
layer of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model is a web application attack [98]. These 
application-layer attacks often involve a web server and/or a database server, depending on the 
specific type of attack. To exemplify this, consider XYZ-WebTech, a technology company located 
within the United States. At this company, a benchmark would be needed that could be applied to 
web application security testing. However, this company would also need a separate benchmark 
to apply to web service performance monitoring. The body of literature surrounding benchmarking 
discusses the lack of one universal benchmark to detect web application attacks. Currently, the fact 
that there is no benchmark for web application attack detection has led authors to develop their 
own benchmarks for their specific datasets [56, 57, 58, 60, 62]. A discussion of why the 
disadvantages of each approach outweigh their respective advantages is still to come. In addition, 
the reasons authors in the literature attempted to establish their own benchmarks will be explained 
in more detail in the next section.  
54 
 
 
5.3 Motivations for an Application Layer Benchmark 
Once a benchmark is created, such as the MIT Lincoln Lab dataset for detecting network-layer 
attacks from 1998 [99], the attackers find new avenues to explore. This process is nearly cyclic in 
nature since attackers are continuously looking for different ways to access important information, 
such as web server or database server logs. Such logs may hold highly sensitive information 
including company passwords, client credit card data or employee payroll information, for 
instance. Measures such as intrusion detection systems are in place to prevent such actions, but no 
benchmark is available to evaluate the efficacy of the detection systems. Relevant characteristics 
of the numerous benchmarks that independent studies have instituted must be considered when 
developing a benchmark for detecting application layer attacks.  
 
Among the benchmarks individual authors have proposed in the literature, all authors agree that 
there is no current benchmark for evaluating datasets for web application layer attack detection. 
For instance, for authors working with cloud-based datasets, it is stated that existing monitoring 
frameworks such as Amazon CloudWatch, do not monitor all of an application’s components [56]. 
Since the release of the DARPA dataset in 1998 and similar datasets in surrounding years, no 
updated datasets have been published as a benchmark. The datasets published in the 1990s are 
irrelevant now. Specifically for this chapter, the DARPA dataset [99] or the KDD Cup dataset 
[100] are not only outdated, but also focused on network layer level attacks rather than the web 
application layer. Two examples of the multiple network layer attacks are depicted in the Figures 
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below. Figure 25 shows the steps involved in an Apache2 attack, and Figure 26 illustrates how a 
User-to-Root attack would occur.  
 
 
 
Figure 25: An Apahce2 Attack Illustration 
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Figure 26: User-to-Root Attack Diagram  
57 
 
 
Attacks such as the previous examples cause issues at the network layer, but are not the same 
attacks leading to havoc at the application layer. Due to this situation, authors have transitioned 
towards crafting their own benchmark in a controlled environment [57]. Common characteristics 
of benchmarks across the literature included a consistent focus on application-layer attack 
detection by training and testing their datasets. During a training phase, the researchers would use 
normal day-to-day logs generated by user activities and regular business actions that were 
simulated on a web server and/or database server. Testing datasets were often the datasets that 
contained malicious data that researchers placed into the normal data. This was done so that the 
researchers, regardless of their objectives, could easily observe if the attacks were detected by their 
benchmark application or not. Similarly, our case studies used training and testing data as well. 
The observed dissimilarities can demonstrate what should be the best suitable application and 
potential scope for the benchmark. For example, a few of the benchmarks proposed to detect 
application-layer attacks, or data security breaches, were heavily reliant on complex coding 
schemes [62] and using JAVA platforms posed issues as well [56, 63]. 
 
5.4 Generating Data and Setting up a Test Environment  
An environment that is used to generate data has to be very controlled to ensure that no attacks can 
be introduced into the setting. For this chapter, the benchmark datasets were generated through the 
use of a virtual machine cluster using VMware Workstation 12 on the host machine [101]. The 
host machine is a 64-bit standalone server running an AMD FX 8350 eight core processor at 4Ghz, 
contains 32 GB of physical memory and 64 GB of virtual memory. The operating system on the 
host machine is Windows 7 Ultimate. Figure 27 is a diagram showing the environment that was 
used for this data generation process. Having a virtual setting for the benchmark generation 
provides an additional layer of defense against any out-of-network traffic. Thus, the resulting web 
application traffic was all generated by the user actions and the benchmark was known to be free 
of application layer attack attempts. 
 
Some of the virtual environments had a Windows 7 operating system while others ran on a Linux 
operating system. This variation in the operating system was utilized to make sure the benchmark 
was applicable to machines with Windows and Linux environments. All security features, such as 
antivirus and firewalls, were deactivated to allow for the generation of attack data. Each virtual 
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environment had the same baseline software installed including Microsoft Office and Notepad++ 
and Google Chrome served as the default web browser.  
 
 
Figure 27: The Environment for Data Generation 
 
In addition to the baseline software, a popular open source software named XAMPP was added to 
each virtual environment. This web application works across operating systems and incorporates 
Apache, MySQL, PHP and PERL. To generate datasets in the controlled environment, Apache 
was used as the web server and MySQL was used as the database management system. 
Implementation of the PHP and PERL features of the application were beyond the scope of this 
thesis work. Both the Apache web server and the MySQL database management system kept logs 
of information about what was occurring on the system while XAMPP was running. A total of five 
web applications were installed on the virtual machine cluster, and the user was only accessing 
one web application at a time. The web applications that were installed on the virtual cluster were 
all open source applications and already integrated with the XAMPP software. These applications 
had various functions, which led to the creation of different types of data over the course of four 
days for the final benchmarking dataset. 
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5.5 Evaluating the Benchmark 
Multiple web applications were launched in the virtual environments, but the initial benchmark 
was used to evaluate the detection capabilities of the IDS. This data, generated solely from the 
content management system application Joomla, was comprised of basic user action logs and 
utilized to merge with known attack data. Attack data was generated by executing and re-executing 
many known web application layer attacks. The specific virtual environment for this case study 
was running a Windows 7 operating system without any antivirus, firewall, or other known 
security features. A lack of security software in a virtual, otherwise completely controlled, setting 
is required to lower the number of false positive results obtained during the evaluation process.  
 
An anomaly-based IDS is used in this case study to determine which data in the combined datasets 
should be flagged as potential attacks against a web application. As described earlier in Chapter 3, 
entropy is a measure that falls under the category of information theoretic metrics. The entropy 
level of normalized traffic from the Content Management System was represented by a limit (X) 
to create a cut-off point. Any traffic with an entropy level above the pre-determined limit was 
considered anomalous and thus an attack against the Content Management System web 
application. A data security breach would be an example of an outcome from this type of attack. 
For the purposes of comparing the probability distributions of the normal traffic and attack traffic 
to one another, a cross-entropy measure was used. The normal data is also referred to as the learned 
profile because this data was utilized to establish the benchmark. In contrast, the attack dataset is 
also called the new requests because such data was not introduced to the benchmark prior to the 
evaluation step.  
 
To test a new request, the cross entropy between the learned profile and the new request is 
measured. A high level of cross entropy is considered malicious for this study. Based on the 
characteristics of the preliminary dataset from the Content Management System application, three 
cross entropy measures from Chapter 3 were employed: cross entropy for parameter (CEP), cross 
entropy for value (CEV) and cross entropy for value data type (CET). The preliminary results of 
this case study showed that the lowest false positive rate (FPR) was observed for CEV while the 
highest FPR was for the CET. False positive rates ranged from less than 1% to about 4%. The 
lowest true positive rate (TPR) observed was for the CEP equating to almost 84 % of those results. 
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Additionally, the highest TPR was obtained for all measures when considering higher threshold 
levels. Given that previous literature states the average anomaly detection IDS has a FPR of 8.4% 
[41, 49], we can report that this benchmark allowed us to reach our objective of lowering the FPR 
to under 4%. Based on the preliminary evidence, cross entropy was a valid metric for the 
benchmark datasets.  
 
Since the conclusions contain only results from the case study using the Content Management 
System logs, these case study results cannot be generalized across all web applications for attack 
detection approaches. To empirically evaluate the entire set of log files from all five of the 
deployed web applications, another case study would have to be carried out, allowing the 
benchmark to be applied to all of the log files that were generated after the final submission of the 
case study [30]. If additional web application log files are included in benchmark evaluation, the 
empirical conclusion would be further supported and extended to multiple applications based on 
the initial findings in the study. Figure 28 shows the set up for the continuation of the case study 
with examples of open source PHP applications. 
 
 
Figure 28: Web Applications Deployed in Apache and Stored in MySQL 
 
The following Chapter demonstrates the output from Apache logs for these web applications and 
additional tools used during the course of this work.  
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Chapter 6: Implementation and Testing  
6.1 Anomaly Detection 
For the context of this section of the Chapter, it is important to revisit Chapter 3 and review the 
case study we conducted. Our approach was used to detect the occurrence of specific attacks 
including SQLI, RFI, DT and XSS. We used measures of cross entropy to detect anomalies in the 
dataset. Cross entropy was calculated for parameters, values and value types, as illustrated in 
Figures 29 and 30. The resource path in the first line of Figure 29 would be /joomla/index.php. 
The parameter of this resource path is controller followed by the value config.display and the value 
type is config. Similarly, in Figure 30, the last GET request would be parsed into its parameters 
(post, action, message) and values (207, edit, 6). Figure 30 would not have any value types.  
 
 
Figure 29: Content Management System Log Entries 
 
 
Figure 30: Blogging Platform Log Entries 
 
Figure 29 shows an example of normal traffic as GET entries from the Apache server’s log file 
generated by the content management system application named Joomla. Figure 30 shows both 
GET and POST requests. The last GET request is posting a message by a user. The POST examples 
are related to the image that the user uploaded to the blog application. Each log entry, including 
training and testing data, was parsed in this manner through the use of the algorithm we described 
earlier. Once each entry was broken down into its parameters, values and types, the previously 
described cross entropy equations were applied to the data. Overall, the cross entropy of the data 
parameters showed the lowest performance, with a true positive rate of 83.66%. In contrast, the 
cross entropy of data values was the best measure in the study, producing a false positive rate 
below 1% (see Table 11). The implementation and testing of this approach outperformed both 
measures from previous literature as well.  
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6.2 Signature Detection 
The subject matter and discussion in this section is a reflection of the study presented in Chapter 
4. We completed the signature-based approach case study with the same datasets as those used in 
our anomaly case study, but did not have any DT attacks in the attack dataset during that time. Our 
technique for detecting signatures employed a genetic algorithm. For each log entry, we applied 
the algorithm and transformed the data into a binary string. These binary strings, or chromosomes, 
were used to identify the signature of the attacks. A screenshot of the genetic algorithm output was 
presented earlier (see Figure 15). We utilized methods explained in Chapter 4, such as changing 
cross over rates and mutation rates, to increase the variability of the attack signatures. Through the 
use of our genetic algorithm to create new attack signatures, our detection rates were increased 
relative to other literature in the field.  
 
All of the logs from the Content Management System were used to make new signatures. However, 
we deployed many applications after the initial case study, as mentioned. Shortened samples of 
normal traffic from the Apache web server logs of the other applications are presented in the 
Figures below to illustrate the variability across the final dataset. Specifically, the deployed 
applications consisted of a content management system, a blogging platform, a bulletin board 
system, a classifieds marketplace, and an e-commerce platform. In Figure 31, the POST log shows 
that an entry was deleted from the bulletin board while one of the GET requests demonstrates the 
user browsing the forum. Figure 32 provides evidence of the user conducting searches and adding 
content to the classifieds application. Finally, Figure 33 illustrates the user browsing the various 
pages of the e-commerce application by generating GET requests. 
 
 
 Figure 31: Bulletin Board System Log Entries 
 
 
 Figure 32: Classifieds Marketplace Log Entries 
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 Figure 33: E-commerce Platform Log Entries 
 
Attack data was made up of the aforementioned attacks that we successfully simulated. Figure 34 
illustrates a small sample of SQL injection attacks that we purposefully introduced to the IDS 
during testing. Here, the main log information would be the SQL keywords (select-from-where, 
etc.) and database changes that can be seen in Apache logs. The provided Figure demonstrates an 
attacker sending a query to discover which users are super users based on the privilege type the 
user has in the user privilege table. 
 
 
Figure 34: Malicious Data Composed of SQL Injections 
 
In the next Chapter, we present the dissemination of our research results thus far into the work. 
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Chapter 7: Dissemination of Research Results 
 
This chapter illustrates the dissemination of results, such as published conference papers and other 
works completed for this thesis. Below we list the title, abstract, and venue for each dissemination.  
 
7.1 Information Theoretic Anomaly Detection Framework for Web Applications 
Robert Bronte, Hossain Shahriar and Hisham Haddad. Conference Proceedings. Proc. of 40th 
IEEE International Computer and Software Application (COMPSAC), Atlanta, GA June 10-14, 
2016, pp. 394-399. Doi: 10.1109/COMPSAC.2016.139 [30] 
 
Abstract  
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a popular approach to detect attacks in web applications. 
Signature-based IDS may not know all possible attack signatures in advance, thus a 
complementary anomaly-based IDS is deployed to and detect new attacks. In this paper, we 
propose an anomaly detection approach that utilizes three measures: cross entropy for parameter, 
value, and data type. The measures are intended to compare the deviation between learned request 
profiles and a new web request. To reduce the number of incorrect detections, we consider requests 
accessing similar resource paths to learn entropy parameter’s value. We evaluate this approach by 
generating log datasets from a large scale web application (Content Management System). The 
initial results show that the proposed approach can detect all malicious web requests and 
demonstrate lower false positive rates. It outperformed when comparing two other approaches: 
length of parameter value and Mahalanobis Distance. 
 
 
7.2 A Signature-Based Intrusion Detection System for Web Applications based on Genetic 
Algorithms 
Robert Bronte, Hossain Shahriar and Hisham Haddad. Conference Proceedings. Proceedings of 
the 9th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks (SIN '16), July 2016, 
NJ, USA, ACM, pp. 32-39. Doi:10.1145/2947626.2951964 [43] 
 
Abstract 
Web application attacks are an extreme threat to the world’s information technology 
infrastructure. A web application is generally defined as a client-server software application where 
the client uses a user interface within a web browser. Most users are familiar with web application 
attacks. For instance, a user may have received a link in an email that led the user to a malicious 
website. The most widely accepted solution to this threat is to deploy an Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS). Such a system currently relies on signatures of the predefined set of events 
matching with attacks. Issues still arise as all possible attack signatures may not be defined before 
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deploying an IDS. Attack events may not fit with the pre-defined signatures. Thus, there is a need 
to detect new types of attacks with a mutated signature-based detection approach. Most traditional 
literature works describe signature-based IDSs for application layer attacks, but several works 
mention that not all attacks can be detected. It is well known that many security threats can be 
related to software or application development and design or implementation flaws. Given that 
fact, this work expands a new method for signature-based web application layer attack detection. 
We apply a genetic algorithm to analyze web server and database logs and the log entries. The 
work contributes to the development of a mutated signature detection framework. The initial 
results show that the suggested approach can detect specific application layer attacks such as 
Cross-Site Scripting, SQL Injection and Remote File Inclusion attacks. 
  
7.3 Benchmark for Empirical Evaluation of Web Application Anomaly Detectors 
Robert Bronte, Hossain Shahriar and Hisham Haddad. Book Chapter. Benchmark for Empirical 
Evaluation of Web Application Anomaly Detectors. Empirical Research for Software Security: 
Foundations and Experience (under review), [Editors: L. Othmane, M. Jaatun and E. Weippl]. 
[101] 
 
Abstract 
Designing a benchmark that is applicable to a wide range of datasets is not a simple task. Before 
any benchmark can be established, the training and testing data has to be generated. The generation 
of a dataset is accomplished in controlled environments in most studies [65-67]. Within such 
datasets, the data consists of typical user actions on web applications that represent normal traffic 
on the network. By normal data, we mean that no attacks are occurring on the network during the 
data generation process. An attack-free environment is crucial in order to generate normal data, 
which creates the need for controlled study environments. Some examples of common user actions 
on web applications that are logged by the web server and/or database server are login attempts, 
edits to a Table in an existing database, uploading files or images, and updating user profiles to 
name a few. Normal datasets serve as referent or baseline datasets to evaluate the benchmark. Once 
a benchmark is established based on normal traffic, the benchmark can then be applied to data in 
a controlled environment with known attack inputs. This process allows individuals to determine 
the number and types of attacks the benchmark can detect.  The detection of data security breaches 
in particular may rely on detecting certain types of application-layer attacks. For instance, the 
emerging threats against web applications are generally methods used to exploit vulnerabilities 
that attackers target in the datasets of web applications.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Future Work 
 
8.1 Conclusions 
In this thesis, we proposed an IDS framework based on an information theory metric to detect web 
application attacks. The focus was on detecting four types of web-based attacks SQLI, XSS, RFI, 
and DT. We proposed three cross entropy measures on parameter, value, and data type. We 
evaluated our approach with a generated dataset by deploying a large scale content management 
web application. The evaluation suggests that the proposed measures can be applied to detect all 
the introduced attacks with a 100% detection rate, while the lowest false positive rate is below 1%. 
Further, all three measures can perform better than two related detection approaches we included: 
length of value and Mahalanobis Distance.  
 
Next, we contributed to the development of a GA-Based IDS where a set of web logs were 
converted to chromosomes and new attack signatures were generated. The approach addresses the 
current limitations of signature-based IDS. A limited number of known attack signatures poses a 
problem, as does the lack of variation of attack signatures. This may cause a system to miss an 
attack in the traffic log. We evaluated our approach with a generated attack dataset from a large 
scale PHP application. The results find that the use of a GA is successful and can act as a 
complement to other existing signature-based IDS approaches. The larger the population size of 
chromosomes becomes (representing numerous rules), the better the GA achieves the capability to 
detect new attacks. Further, by increasing the selection rate and mutation rate, we can generate 
new attack detection rules that can address the limitation of traditional signature-based IDS such 
as the referenced PHPIDS.  
 
Finally, we discussed how a benchmark is defined, the advantages and disadvantages of the 
existing benchmarks and the data attributes that previous authors have analyzed within Chapter 5. 
The metrics and characteristics previously applied to other datasets for application-layer attack 
detection were explained. Additionally, an in-depth description of the host environment was 
provided and samples of log files that would be used to evaluate the benchmark were included. 
We explained entropy and cross entropy measures taken from information theory concepts and 
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how those metrics were applied to the present dataset with a case study. The methodology of the 
case study was compared to other existing application-layer attack detection approaches to 
demonstrate its performance. We intend to deploy even more web applications to validate this 
benchmark approach while also continuing to compare the approach against others in the literature.  
 
Analysis of logs is a common source of detailed information about what occurs on a network or 
host system. Logs with differing content can cause conflicts when trying to present specific 
findings. By developing a framework for a hybrid intrusion detection system, the log data can be 
used to identify attacks and increase detection rates. A hybrid model can be implemented by the 
combination of an anomaly detector that is based on cross entropy measures and a signature 
detection method that incorporates the proposed genetic algorithm. Due to the results we obtained 
in our two case studies, it can be concluded that our approaches are valid and may be useful for 
others to reference. 
 
8.2 Future Work 
The results of our work have shown that improving attack detection rates was a feasible goal. 
However, obstacles were also introduced into the work. This happened with the web applications 
we intended to use for the studies. We plan to deploy more open source web applications to 
evaluate the IDS approach. We will expand our work to include those four web applications and 
repeat the studies as one large study that implements each approach into the finalized hybrid model. 
In our future work, we will compare our proposed techniques based on any additional methods 
seen in the literature. For instance, we can compare our genetic algorithm approach to other 
algorithms seen in related works. We also plan to implement our combined approaches is through 
the use of a rule-based technique that combines the cross entropy measures used earlier into one 
metric. Developing a hybrid intrusion detection system derived from our methods thus far seems 
to be the beginning of the ever-changing attacks that hackers continuously execute.   
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